



The role of financial incentives in technology adoption

Evidence from a framed experiment in Northern Ghana

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
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Background

Smallholder farmers across Sub-Saharan Africa face mounting challenges from erratic rainfall, land degradation, and limited access to resources, which threatens food security and rural livelihoods (Tilman et al., 2002). In Ghana, these challenges were sharply exposed by the **severe drought in 2024**, highlighting the vulnerability of rainfed agricultural systems and the need for climate-resilient strategies (USDA, 2024). **Sustainable Intensification (SI)**—increasing productivity on existing farmland while maintaining long-term ecological resilience—has emerged as a promising response (Pretty, 2018; Rudel, 2020). A key SI pathway is the use of **drought-tolerant varieties**, which maintain average yields, income, and food security (Bezu et al., 2014; Smale & Mason, 2014; Zeng et al., 2015). Yet adoption remains low due to high upfront costs, limited access to credit and insurance, weak extension services, and uncertainty under risk (Suri, 2011; Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). To test this, we conducted a **framed field experiment** in mixed-cereal agricultural systems in Northern Ghana, where farmers chose between traditional and drought-tolerant maize seeds under varying cost and insurance scenarios.

Study Area



Research Goals

Objective

Understand how financial incentives influence adoption of drought-tolerant maize seeds

Hypotheses

- H1:** Risk averse farmers prefer drought-resistant seeds over traditional seeds
- H2:** Up-front cost of drought-resistant seeds reduces their adoption rate for risk averse farmers
- H3:** Index-based insurance increases the adoption of drought-resistant seeds when offered conditional on their adoption, compared to when it is offered for any type of seeds
- H4:** Community refunds of excess payments due to positive basis risk enhance the attractiveness of insured seeds

Literature cited

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Experimental Design

Framed field experiment on maize investment decisions

- Farmers make decisions for their main maize plot
- Choice between:
 - Traditional seeds (no cost)
 - Drought-tolerant seeds (require upfront investment)
- Decision framed using an initial endowment, from which input costs and payoffs are subtracted
- Drought occurs in 4 out of 10 seasons
- Payouts are shown in points, converted to real monetary rewards

Randomized treatments (2 rounds):

Round 1 (R1): Upfront cost levels:

- G1)** no cost (control)
G2) with cost (treatment 1)

Round 2 (R2): Insurance instruments:

- G1)** Non-conditional (control)
G2) Conditional (treatment 1)
G3) Group-based (treatment 2)

Sampling and implementation

- 385 farmers from 3 districts in Northern Ghana
- Randomly selected from a pool of 1,000 COINS baseline survey participants
- Random assignment to treatment groups: 189 in R1G2, 135 in R2G2, and 133 in R2G3
- Includes additional modules to elicit risk and time preferences
- Conduct χ^2 tests between the conditions and run linear regressions (OLS) to control for covariates

Selected Decision Scenarios

R1G2 : Payout Matrix

	Initial Endowment	Cost of Seeds	Drought Season	Enough rain Season
Local seeds	10 points	0 points	10 points	110 Points
Drought-tolerant seeds + Cost 10 points	10 points	10 points	50 points	100 points

R1G2 : Theoretical Outcomes

	Potential loss	Variance	Expected profit	Endowment	Expected wealth
Local	100	2400	70	10	80
Drought-tolerant	50	600	80	0	80

R2G2 : Payout Matrix

	Initial Endowment	Cost of Insurance	Drought Season	Enough rain Season
Local seeds (No Insurance)	10 points	0 points	10 points	110 points
Drought-tolerant seeds + Insurance Cost 5 points	10 points	5 points	65 points	107 points

R2G2 : Theoretical Outcomes


	Potential loss	Variance	Expected profit	Endowment	Expected wealth
Local	100	2400	70	10	80
Drought-tolerant	42	417	90	5	95



Results

Seed Decision

Risk Averse (right bars) vs Non-Risk Averse (left bars) farmers



Round 1 Treatment 1

	χ^2	OLS	Obs.
All	2,33	0,09	357
Risk Averse	1,68	0,08	283

Round 2 Treatment 1

	χ^2	OLS	Obs.
All	21,10***	0,28***	233
Risk Averse	13,76***	0,24***	181

Round 2 Treatment 2

	χ^2	OLS	Obs.
All	15,98***	0,24***	234
Risk Averse	13,12***	0,23***	183

Note: The tables report (i) the χ^2 test value comparing seed choices (traditional vs. drought-tolerant), (ii) the treatment effect on adoption from the OLS model, and (iii) the number of observations. The first rows use all farmers; the second rows restrict the sample to risk-averse farmers. The '***' indicate strong statistical effects ($p < 0.01$), i.e., without them, no systematic differences were found between groups.

Implications for Adoption

- **Risk-averse farmers** favor drought-tolerant seeds
- **Cost alone may not explain adoption:** No systematic differences were observed in R1, suggesting that the recent drought likely heightened the perceived value of resilient seeds across all groups
- **Insurance design is key:** Conditional and group-based schemes led to higher uptake of drought-tolerant seeds, highlighting their potential for scaling resilient practices
- **Test bundling:** Embedding input–insurance packages in real delivery channels can assess uptake and feasibility beyond the experiment

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